from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition

  • Carnap, Rudolf 1891-1970. German-born American philosopher whose antimetaphysical views, set forth in such works as The Logical Structure of the World (1928) and The Logical Foundations of Probability (1950), were central to the development of logical positivism.


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  • Carnap is held in highest esteem by people who deal with questions in metaphysics and philosophy of math that he would have likely regarded as nonsensical. (see ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’) Quite thought that epistemology as done by traditional analytic philosophers was bankrupt, and needed to be stripped of all normative terms and replaced by empirical behaviorist psychology.

    Matthew Yglesias » Richard Rorty

  • Lots of philosophers think that the debate about ’special composition’ (roughly, whether composite objects exist) is a pseudo-debate, and would join Carnap and Wittgenstein in dismissing it.

    Matthew Yglesias » Richard Rorty

  • Another Goodmanian lesson is that inductive logic must be sensitive to the meanings of predicates, strongly suggesting that a purely syntactic approach such as Carnap's is doomed.

    Interpretations of Probability

  • An indication that the map of philosophical positions was drawn then in a manner very different from today is to found in the fact that this principle found favor among both anti-metaphysical logical empiricists, such as Carnap, and neo-Kantians, such as Cassirer.

    Einstein's Philosophy of Science

  • TC” expressed the purely analytic component of the theory, its “A-postulate” (or so-called Carnap sentence).

    Vienna Circle

  • In The Logical Structure of the World, Rudolph Carnap attempts to show how a "constructional system" can be built the purpose of which is "to order the objects of all sciences into a system according to their reducibility to one another."

    Philosophy and Literature

  • As Carnap puts it, for the work to become a "bearer of expression," there must be "an act of creation or transformation on the part of one or several individuals."

    Philosophy and Literature

  • The former, Carnap maintains, are reducible (for the purposes of this system) to the latter:

    Philosophy and Literature

  • Thus aesthetic judgment is unavoidably subjective, requiring the "transformation" Carnap describes, a process that will be bound to the "point of view and interest" of the "beholder," as Dewey has it.

    Philosophy and Literature

  • Although he uses the word "experience" rather than "psychological occurences," and although he is more rooted to the "physical object" than is Carnap in what seems an essentially phenomenological analyis of the experience of art, John Dewey in Art as Experience offers a philosophy of art and the reception of art that at least has a family resemblance to what Carnap is suggesting here.

    Philosophy and Literature


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