nondeterministically

The simplest event-causal incompatibilist theory takes the requirements of a good compatibilist account and adds that certain agent-involving events that cause the action must nondeterministically cause it.

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

On an alternative account, it is required that a free action be caused by the agent and nondeterministically caused by certain agent-involving events, such as the agent's having certain reasons and a certain intention.

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

If a decision is nondeterministically caused, and if there remains until it occurs a chance that the agent will instead (at that moment) make a different decision, then there is a possible world that is exactly the same as the actual world up until the time of the decision, but in which the agent makes the alternative decision then.

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

The account requires simply that the prior deliberative events (such as Elena's judging the reason to A to be stronger) that cause the decision to A nondeterministically cause it, and that until Elena makes that decision, there remains a chance that she will instead at t decide to B (in which case, prior deliberative events, such as her recognizing a reason to B, will have nondeterministically caused this alternative decision).

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

The incompatibilist theories that have been offered fall into three main groups, depending on which type of indeterminism (uncaused events, nondeterministically caused events, agent - [or substance -] caused events) they require.

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

Suppose that there is a nonzero probability that Leo's having the reasons favoring telling the truth (together with his having the indicated intention) will nondeterministically cause his deciding to tell the truth; and suppose that there is, as well, a nonzero probability that his having the reasons favoring lying

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

When the formation of a preference is nondeterministically caused and it deterministically causes a decision and subsequent action, then a preference that partly constitutes the agent, one that is generated by an evaluative faculty that partly constitutes the agent, and one that the agent could have prevented

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

But more than this, they require that there be indeterminism of a certain sort (e.g., with some events entirely uncaused, or nondeterministically caused, or caused by agents and not deterministically caused by events) and that this indeterminism be located in specific places (generally, in the occurrence of decisions and other actions).

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

Of course, the manuever raises a question about how the agent could be responsible for her earlier actions, given that the account in question will require that some of these, too, were nondeterministically caused.

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008

His decision is caused by him, and it is nondeterministically caused by his having reasons favoring the action decided upon (and his having the intention to make up his mind).

Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke, Randolph 2008