Contextualism

Contextualism about knowledge says that most of our everyday utterances of the form ˜S knows P™ are true, even though the strength of epistemic position in those instances does not meet our highest standards.

Epistemic Contextualism Rysiew, Patrick 2007

Brady, M., and D. Pritchard, 2005, “Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects”, The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219): 161-171.

Epistemic Contextualism Rysiew, Patrick 2007

Contextualism is, from this perspective, skepticism neutral, in that it does not address this part of the issue.

Epistemic Contextualism Rysiew, Patrick 2007

Stainton, R., forthcoming, “Contextualism in Epistemology and the Context-Sensitivity of ˜Knows™”, in Campbell et al., eds.

Epistemic Contextualism Rysiew, Patrick 2007

“Contextualism Contested Some More”, in Steup and Sosa, eds., pp. 47-56, 62-66.

Epistemic Contextualism Rysiew, Patrick 2007

Contextualism resolves this conflict by saying that the first premise is false only in low standards contexts.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

Contextualism and the ambiguity response, as discussed in the previous two sections, leave out one important detail.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

"Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons."

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

So, the answer to the first question about the truth of contextualism seems to be: Contextualism about knowledge attributions is correct.

Skepticism Klein, Peter 2005

Contextualism is intended as a closure preserving response to skepticism.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005