Coriscus

For this is exactly as though he had asked ‘Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?’, supposing them to be both in or both out: for in both cases there is a number of propositions: for though the simple answer be true, that does not make the question one.

On Sophistical Refutations 2002

They say, not that Coriscus is both musical and unmusical, but that this Coriscus is musical and this

On Sophistical Refutations 2002

‘Coriscus’ means simply this particular soul and this particular body, the individual is analogous to the universal in its composition.

Metaphysics Aristotle 2002

‘If Coriscus be different from “man”, he is different from himself: for he is a man’: or ‘If he be different from Socrates, and Socrates be a man, then’, they say, ‘he has admitted that Coriscus is different from a man, because it so happens (accidit) that the person from whom he said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man’.

On Sophistical Refutations 2002

But as to the approaching figure and Coriscus he knows both that it is approaching and that he is Coriscus.

On Sophistical Refutations 2002

It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally; and ‘Socrates’ or ‘Coriscus’, if even the soul of Socrates may be called Socrates, has two meanings (for some mean by such a term the soul, and others mean the concrete thing), but if ‘Socrates’ or

Metaphysics Aristotle 2002

‘Coriscus’ because one of the parts of the phrase is an accident of the other, i.e. ‘musical’ is an accident of

Metaphysics Aristotle 2002

The case is similar if the accident is predicated of a genus or of any universal name, e.g. if one says that man is the same as ‘musical man’; for this is either because ‘musical’ is an accident of man, which is one substance, or because both are accidents of some individual, e.g. Coriscus.

Metaphysics Aristotle 2002

For the arguments of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question whether ‘musical’ and ‘lettered’ are different or the same, and whether ‘musical Coriscus’ and ‘Coriscus’ are the same, and whether

Metaphysics Aristotle 2002

‘But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing.’

On Sophistical Refutations 2002