Frankena

Internalists 'arguments, Frankena urges, trade on a confusion between exciting or motivating reasons and justifying reasons.

Reasons for Action: Justification vs. Explanation Lenman, James 2009

This point was made very clearly by W.K. Frankena in a landmark article published in Mind (Frankena 1939).

Moral Non-Naturalism Ridge, Michael 2008

Finally, as Frankena also nicely pointed out, it cannot be assumed at the outset that what Moore calls the naturalistic fallacy really is a mistake of any kind.

Moral Non-Naturalism Ridge, Michael 2008

In other contexts, ˜non-naturalism™ denotes the epistemological thesis that knowledge of basic moral principles and value judgements are in some sense self-evident (see Frankena 1963: 85-86).

Moral Non-Naturalism Ridge, Michael 2008

However, as Frankena (1964) argues, for Lewis directly found goodness still seems to be as natural a quality or property of certain experiences as any other qualia directly apprehended in experience.

Clarence Irving Lewis Hunter, Bruce 2007

One conspicuous omission from the list, however, is the increasingly popular view that certain environmental entities or qualities have intrinsic value (although Frankena may again assert that these are implicitly represented by one or more items already on the list).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value Zimmerman, Michael J. 2007

This view, he suggested, could be found in Butler's claim that “Reasonable Self-love and Conscience are the two chief or superior principles in the nature of man,” each generating an obligation, though Frankena (1992) and Darwall (2000) have raised questions about the historical accuracy of this attribution.

Henry Sidgwick Schultz, Barton 2006

(Schneewind, 1977) has stressed this influence, along with the influence of Joseph Butler, whose works persuaded Sidgwick of the falsity of psychological egoism and of the reality of other than self-interested actions (Frankena, 1992).

Henry Sidgwick Schultz, Barton 2006

Oxford: Parker & Co. Frankena, William, 1974, “Sidgwick and the Dualism of Practical Reason”, Monist, 58: 449-67.

Henry Sidgwick Schultz, Barton 2006

Frankena, William, 1968, “Obligation and Value in the E.hics of G.E. Moore,”, in Schilpp 1968.

Moore's Moral Philosophy Hurka, Thomas 2005