Godfrey-Smith

Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2007), “Information in Biology”, in The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology,

Molecular Biology Darden, Lindley 2009

(For a similar view of the role of the informational framework in foregrounding sequence properties, see Godfrey-Smith 2007.)

Molecular Biology Darden, Lindley 2009

However, as Peter Godfrey-Smith has noted, ˜All the genes can code for, if they code for anything, is the primary structure (amino acid sequence) of a protein™ (Godfrey-Smith 1999, 328).

The Distinction Between Innate and Acquired Characteristics Griffiths, Paul 2009

Godfrey-Smith (1993) argues that systemic concepts of function do permit attributions of malfunction.

Concepts of Disease and Health Murphy, Dominic 2008

This view has gained much support in the literature in recent years, being defended in influential papers by Dugatkin and Reeve (1994) and more recently by Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002).

The Biological Notion of Individual Wilson, Robert A. 2007

One approach is to retreat to a narrow conception of coding specifically aimed at clarifying the sense in which DNA provides information for the synthesis of polypeptides, but not for higher-level traits (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2000).

Molecular Genetics Waters, Ken 2007

Both Godfrey-Smith (2000a) and Griffiths (2001) have argued that there is one highly restricted use of a fairly rich semantic language within genetics that is justified.

Biological Information Godfrey-Smith, Peter 2007

There are several ways in which the details of such an account can be developed (Godfrey-Smith 1999), some focusing on the evolved functions of the genetic machinery as a whole, and others on the natural selection of particular genetic elements.

Biological Information Godfrey-Smith, Peter 2007

Whether or not a consumer-based approach is desirable, Millikan's theory has some advantages in comparison with Dretske's indicator semantics (see Godfrey-Smith 1989).

Teleological Theories of Mental Content Neander, Karen 2004

Godfrey-Smith makes an excellent argument at some point in the book (chapter 7, on the gene's eye view) that genes are not at all the sort of things Richard Dawkins and some other biologists think they are.

Scientific Blogging 2009