Leftow

Well aware of this problem, Leftow tries to to clarify his theory, to show why it doesn't amount to any undesirable form of modalism.

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

In a later piece, Leftow makes clear that Latin trinitarianism needn't commit to trope theory about properties.

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

The term “Trinity monotheism” originates with Leftow (1999, 209), and the best developed such theory is by J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, who embrace the label.

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

Granting that it's possible for there to be group minds, Leftow argues that this concept will be no help to the social trinitarian.

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

Using familial analogies, Leftow challenges Swinburne's claim that the Three would lack an overriding reason to produce a fourth, noting that “Cooperating with two to love yet another is a greater” balancing act “than cooperating with one to love yet another” (241).

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

Leftow objects that we have no idea whether or not this is possible (non-contradictory), as we don't know what, if anything, would preserve the distinctness of the minds.

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

Leftow argues that his theory isn't any undesirable form of modalism because

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

Certainly, Leftow is correct in thinking that the argument just quoted is invalid.

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

We follow a four-fold classification which sorts them by how they claim to secure monotheism (Leftow 1999).

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009

Leftow explores the answer, found in some twentieth century theologians, but not much defended in recent philosophical theology, that the three persons are one God because “the Trinity has or is a divine mind composed of the Persons 'minds” (1999, 221).

Trinity Tuggy, Dale 2009