Pareto-efficient

In other words, classic Jeremy Bentham utilitarianism versus Pareto-efficient Kantian deontology?

Who Loses From Efficiency?, Bryan Caplan | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty 2009

In other words, classic Jeremy Bentham utilitarianism versus Pareto-efficient Kantian deontology?

Who Loses From Efficiency?, Bryan Caplan | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty 2009

It has been shown by Varian (1976) that, if preferences are sufficiently diverse and numerous (a continuum), then the competitive equilibrium with equal shares is the only Pareto-efficient and envy-free allocation.

Economics and Economic Justice Fleurbaey, Marc 2008

If one also requires the selection to be Pareto-efficient, then one obtains a characterization of the competitive equilibrium with equal shares (Gevers 1986).

Economics and Economic Justice Fleurbaey, Marc 2008

Stiglitz J.E. 1987, “The theory of Pareto-efficient and optimal redistributive taxation”, in Auerbach, Feldstein (eds.).

Economics and Economic Justice Fleurbaey, Marc 2008

It is Pareto-efficient because, by an important theorem of welfare economics, any perfectly competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient (in absence of asymmetric information, externalities, public goods).

Economics and Economic Justice Fleurbaey, Marc 2008

For instance, Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) found out that there may not exist envy-free and Pareto-efficient allocations in the context of production with unequal skills (when there are high-skilled individuals who are strongly averse to labor).

Economics and Economic Justice Fleurbaey, Marc 2008

A competitive equilibrium with equal shares (i.e., equal budgets) is the central example of a Pareto-efficient and envy-free allocation.

Economics and Economic Justice Fleurbaey, Marc 2008

Instead, the claim of rational choice contractarianism is that the correct account of binding moral norms is one that implies that if these norms are followed, the outcomes will be Pareto-efficient.

Game Theory and Ethics Verbeek, Bruno 2004

Whereas contractarian choice would have it that (Stag, Stag) is the correct norm to settle upon, evolutionary game theory teaches us that it is unlikely that the Pareto-efficient equilibrium will be selected in a process of repeated interactions.

Game Theory and Ethics Verbeek, Bruno 2004