Representationalism

Representationalism about pain is the view that the entire phenomenology of a pain experience is strictly identical to its representational or intentional content.

Pain Aydede, Murat 2009

“Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?”, in Alter and Walter (2007),

Functionalism Levin, Janet 2009

Representationalism, as I have presented it so far, is an identity thesis with respect to qualia: qualia are supposedly one and the same as certain representational contents.

Qualia Tye, Michael 2007

Shoemaker, S. 1998 "Two Cheers for Representationalism,"

Qualia Tye, Michael 2007

Frank Jackson, “Some Reflections on Representationalism” (PDF).

Sense-Data Huemer, Michael 2007

Representationalism itself is a claim only about qualia in our sense, while transparency is about features of experience more generally.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

˜Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience™, Noûs 36: 137-51.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

Representationalism (or intentionalism) is the thesis that phenomenal properties are determined by representational properties.

The Contents of Perception Siegel, Susanna 2005

Representationalism itself seems to be included in that stock of baseline platitudes; at any rate there is a platitudinous version of it.

Warranted Christian Belief 1932- 2000

Representationalism, crudely construed, is the thesis that we can represent the world as it is.

Larval Subjects . 2010