Sellarsian

Desires, in Thompson's Sellarsian view, are a mistake on a par with sense-data; just as the sense-datum theorist treats a linguistic device for hedging one's commitments (“It appears to be ¦”) as naming a psychological state (a mere appearance), so the Humean theorist of practical rationality is treating a linguistic device for sorting out the order of subsidiary actions

Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions Millgram, Elijah 2009

The philosophy of technology, in contrast, has traditionally largely ignored the community of engineers and has almost exclusively dealt with the place of technology in, and its meaning for, human society, human culture, and human existence, in terms of Sellarsian broadness.

Philosophy of Technology Franssen, Maarten 2009

The standard argument for eliminative materialism begins with the Sellarsian thesis that we employ a theoretical framework to explain and predict intelligent behavior.

Eliminative Materialism Ramsey, William 2007

And, if Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger think that Husserl's phenomenological reduction to a sphere of ˜pure™ consciousness cannot be completed, and their reasons make them externalists of some sort, it hardly seems to establish that they are committed to a (Sellarsian or Rylean) realm of raw sensory phenomenal consciousness, devoid of intentionality.

Consciousness and Intentionality Siewert, Charles 2006

Consonant with the Sellarsian account of linguistic meaning as functional classification, this hypothetical Rylean language, although lacking any resources for speaking of inner episodes, thoughts or experiences has been enriched by the fundamental resources of semantical discourse ” enabling our ancestors to say of the their peers 'utterances that they mean this or that, that they stand in various logical relations to one another, that they are true or false, and so on.

Wilfrid Sellars Rosenberg, Jay 2009

If one adopts (b), and something like a Sellarsian or Davidsonian distinction between sensation and thought, putting phenomenal character exclusively on the ˜sensation™ side, and intentionality exclusively on the ˜thought™ side of this divide, the place of consciousness in a philosophical account of knowledge will likely be meager ” at most phenomenal character will be a causal condition, without a role to play in the warrant or justification of claims to knowledge.

Consciousness and Intentionality Siewert, Charles 2006