Yablo

However, there also exist paradoxes such as Yablo's that do not rely on circularity and self-reference.

Self-Reference Bolander, Thomas 2008

Rosen (2001), Yablo (2005), Leng (forthcoming), and perhaps Melia

Platonism in Metaphysics Balaguer, Mark 2009

For example, Yablo (1992), suggests that mental and physical properties stand in the relation of determinable and determinate (just as red stands to scarlet), and argues that our conviction that a cause should be commensurate with its effects permits us to take the determinable, rather than the determinate, property to count as causally efficacious in psychological explanation.

Functionalism Levin, Janet 2009

Yablo, Stephen, 2000, “Apriority and Existence,” in Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori,

Plural Quantification Linnebo, Øystein 2008

Yablo (1992) calls it “Physical Determinism”, although as Yablo and others have pointed out, Completeness need not be taken to imply causal determinism:

Mental Causation Robb, David 2008

In contrast to Yablo, Leng (2005, forthcoming) responds to Burgess's argument by defending revolutionary fictionalism.

Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics Balaguer, Mark 2008

Jackson (1996), Yablo (1997), and the entry on mental causation.

Externalism About Mental Content Lau, Joe 2008

It's not clear how seriously Yablo takes this idea, however; at any rate, it seems pretty clear that if he endorses it at all, he thinks it's true in only some contexts, i.e., of only some pure mathematical utterances.

Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics Balaguer, Mark 2008

But so long as there is a fair number of unobtrusive metaphors, Yablo may have a point.

Fictionalism Eklund, Matti 2007

Even so, there is something telling about what Yablo says.

Fictionalism Eklund, Matti 2007