adverbialism

This sort of analysis of experiences is sometimes known as adverbialism in the literature because in perceiving a red object one is said to be in a state of perceiving something “red-ly.”

Pain Aydede, Murat 2009

Many early direct realists embraced adverbialism because adverbialism promised a way of being realist about experiences while avoiding an act-object view of them.

Pain Aydede, Murat 2009

Furthermore, even when one might successfully get rid of mysterious mental objects like sense-data with this adverbialist move, it is not clear whether adverbialism might still lead to a form of property dualism according to which one is directly aware of certain (non-physical) phenomenological qualities instantiated by experiences realized by brain states.

Pain Aydede, Murat 2009

There are various technical difficulties with adverbialism, especially when dealing with phenomenologically complex overall experiences such as having three pains of different qualitative character simultaneously occurring in three different locations in one's body.

Pain Aydede, Murat 2009

To recap, strong representationalism is the modern day's direct realism about perception, where adverbialism is replaced by representationalism run on a naturalistic story about how perceptual experiences acquire their (analog) representational content that in turn constitutes their phenomenology.

Pain Aydede, Murat 2009

For our purposes, keeping up with the general naturalistic motivation behind developing direct realist views, we can take adverbialism as an attempt to get rid of mysterious mental objects or qualities in favor of metaphysically less costly states or activities of persons or manners of perceiving that qualify persons qua subjects of experience.

Pain Aydede, Murat 2009

But (as was not often noticed), adverbialism is a semantical thesis about the logical forms of sensation statements, and as such it has been severely and tellingly criticized, e.g., by Jackson (1977), Butchvarov (1980) and Lycan (1987).

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

The second position is a version of adverbialism about visual experiences, according to which such experiences are nothing more than modifications of a subject that can be characterized by specialized adverbs specifying how one is visually

The Contents of Perception Siegel, Susanna 2005

Strictly speaking, it should be noted that so long as the core thesis of adverbialism is that experiences are modifications or properties of the subject, adverbialism leaves open whether experiences are assessable for accuracy or not.

The Contents of Perception Siegel, Susanna 2005

Johnston (1987) and Haslanger (1989b) all propose versions of adverbialism.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004