from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License

  • adj. Of, pertaining to or supporting compatibilism, the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas
  • n. A supporter of compatibilism


compatible +‎ -ism (Wiktionary)


  • According to this view of free will, and in contrast with what are known as compatibilist approaches, free will is incompatible with determinism, and so it is impossible even for an omnipotent being to make it the case that someone freely chooses to do what is right.

    The Problem of Evil

  • Intuitive free will is libertarian, not compatibilist.

    Sam Harris: Free Will (And Why You Still Don't Have It)

  • Most people's view of the mind is implicitly dualist and libertarian and not materialist and compatibilist . . .

    Sam Harris: Free Will (And Why You Still Don't Have It)

  • Compatibilists, like Dan Dennett, maintain that free will is compatible with causal determinism see his fine books, Freedom Evolves and Elbow Room; for other compatibilist arguments see Ayer, Chisholm, Strawson, Frankfurt, Dennett, and Watson here.

    Sam Harris: Free Will (And Why You Still Don't Have It)

  • This presents an intriguing possibility: both the compatibilist experimentalists and the incompatibilist philosophers are right.


  • Unsurprisingly, some working the compatibilist side of the street have been quick to assert the contrary.


  • On the other hand, the Nahmias et al. study, in contrast to Nichols and Knobe's abstract condition, requires a concrete social judgment; perhaps subjects are more likely to make compatibilist judgments when faced with the problem of making a specific social attribution.


  • Woolfolk et al. 's suspicion was, in effect, that people's (possibly tacit) theory of responsibility is compatibilist.


  • A compatibilist, reason responsiveness account of responsibility for outcomes says that an agent is responsible for outcomes that he or she brings about in the right sort of way through the agent's actions (or omissions) where these issue from an action-generating process that is sufficiently sensitive to practical reasons, e.g., normal human deliberation, and that actions may issue from such mechanisms whether or not determinism obtains

    Justice and Bad Luck

  • This premise, supported as it is by the Consequence Argument and near cousins of the Consequence Argument (see section 4.1), will demand of Wolf that, minimally, she show what is wrong with arguments like the Consequence Argument, and optimally, that she offer some positive compatibilist account of the ability to do otherwise.



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