compositionalist

How could a soft actualist compositionalist respond to Plantinga's argument?

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003

But on the soft actualist compositionalist view, Gato's being blue-eyed doesn't exist in W1 because one of its constituents is missing in W1.

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003

It also follows that a soft actualist compositionalist cannot accept Plantinga's version of Scotus's principle (SP):

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003

Let us look at the concrete compositionalist view first.

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003

If loving Ralph is not recognized as a distinct entity, then it seems that the compositionalist needs a notion of direction or order of constituents to differentiate distinct states of affairs (Armstrong 1997).

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003

On a compositionalist view, then, each basic state of affairs has a property or relation that is constitutive of it.

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003

If a soft actualist is a concrete compositionalist, she might note that her basic non-obtaining states of affairs are composed of entities the naturalist should feel comfortable with ” concrete particulars and their features and relations.

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003

In other words, a situation, S, makes factual a state of affairs, H. just in case S encodes the SOA-property corresponding to H. Abstract object theory allows that states of affairs (and thus SOA-properties) may have concrete particulars as constituents ” thus satisfying a compositionalist desideratum.

States of Affairs Wetzel, Thomas 2003