disjunctivist

For now we can at least say that the minimal commitment of a view that can be labelled a disjunctivist theory of perception is that veridical perceptions and hallucinations differ mentally in some significant respect ” i.e., there are certain mental features that veridical perceptions have that hallucinations cannot have.

Petty Injuries 2009

Martin also appeals to this idea in offering a suggestion as to what the disjunctivist should say about the experience of impossible scenes.

Petty Injuries 2009

If the disjunctivist about X makes the additional claim that the particular mental feature, X, that is unique to the case of veridical perception is essential to the fundamental kind of mental event it is, then they will also be a fundamental kind disjunctivist.

Petty Injuries 2009

For example this sort of disjunctivist may hold that the intentional content of a veridical perception is constitutively dependent on mind-independent objects, while the intentional content a hallucination is not.

Petty Injuries 2009

Does this formulation of the disjunctivist commitment make

Petty Injuries 2009

There is another version of the causal argument that can be used to put pressure on the disjunctivist to accept that there is a common element to veridical perception and causally matching hallucination.

Petty Injuries 2009

So the modified causal argument can be seen as part of an attempt to force the naïve realist disjunctivist into an untenable position with respect to causally matching hallucinations.

Petty Injuries 2009

Those who reject the metaphysical assumption that mental events (or states) have a ˜fundamental™ kind may instead formulate their disjunctivist stance in terms of the claim that the differences between the kind of mental event that occurs when one veridically perceives the world and the kind of mental event that occurs when one hallucinates are due to a differences in mental features of the events in question.

Petty Injuries 2009

For similar reasons the disjunctivist can agree that there is a sense in which veridical perceptions and hallucinations can be thought of as experiences of the same kind.

Petty Injuries 2009

So the disjunctivist rejects the claim that the differences between a case of veridical perception and a case of hallucination can simply be due to differences in the extra-mental states of affairs that obtain in those situations.

Petty Injuries 2009