from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License

  • adj. Supporting eliminativism, the materialist position which holds that folk psychology presents a false view of the mind
  • n. A supporter of eliminativism.


from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License

eliminative +‎ -ist


  • Moreover, by analyzing statements of some leading contemporary scholars who support social constructivism about race, I hope to demonstrate that their eliminativist views are actually in conflict with what the best contemporary science tells us about human genetic variation.

    A Vindication of the Concept of Race

  • If you continue reading your Wiki you will see that not all materialism is eliminativist materialism.

    Bunny and a Book

  • I am technically correct about Schwartz because even an eliminativist does not have any difficulty with brain changes resulting from information processing in the brain, as Schwartz claims.

    Bunny and a Book

  • Within the philosophy of mind, an eliminativist materialism is the most radical form of materialism as it further posits that mental states (e.g., desire, hope) are not real, do not truly exist, but rather are artifacts of a "folk psychology," artifacts that neuroscience and other purportedly pure scientific disciplines will some day, at some more enlightened point in the future, vanquish.

    On Thursday, the Legg report will be published along with...

  • I mean, it was freaking obvious considering Dennett denies qualia and is well known for being an eliminativist (do you guys know what that means?) when it comes to various mental properties.

    Blurring the Line

  • You confuse Dennett's stance with eliminative materialism (Dennett may be considered an eliminativist with respect to qualia, which he considers an incohent concept, but not with respect to intentionality, beliefs, or agency).

    Blurring the Line

  • First off, Dennett is an eliminativist about qualia, not about intentionality or agency.

    Blurring the Line

  • Still want to maintain that Dennett is an eliminativist about intentionality?

    Blurring the Line

  • The eliminativist believes that intentionality is ontologically reducible to the non-intentional without remainder.

    Backing Into an Evidentiary Standard for ID

  • There are other ways of being eliminativist about pains having to do with the nature of qualia or the alleged existence of apparent phenomenal objects.



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