endurantism

The issue here is not the truth of endurantism and perdurantism as accounts of the persistence of objects and events.

Auditory Perception O'Callaghan, Casey 2009

David Lewis (1986a, 1988) built on this point of Geach's to mount an attack on endurantism, the theory that objects persist by being wholly located at different times, and that there can be strict identity between an object existing at one time and one existing at another time.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties Weatherson, Brian 2006

(See section 7 from an argument from physics against presentism and thus, perhaps, against endurantism.)

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Mellor (1981; 1998) and Johnston (1987) combine eternalism and endurantism.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Merricks (1995) and Hinchliff (1996) argue that eternalism rules out endurantism, because of the problem of change; see the suggested reading at the end of section 3 for endurance-friendly eternalist accounts of change.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Or are eternalists free to choose between endurantism and perdurantism?

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

A third argument from STR to perdurantism does not rely on the claim that STR is out-and-out incompatible with endurantism.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

One big problem with Ross’s proposal is that (deliberately or not) he is presupposing 3Dism/endurantism.

Species Membership, Mental Properties, and Parties of Death 2006