epistemicism

Two of the leading theories of vagueness, epistemicism and supervaluationism, provide principled reasons to reject M2.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

Weatherson 2003a argues that this problem becomes more pressing when one applies epistemicism to the Problem of the Many than when one merely wields epistemicism to solve the

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

If, on the balance of considerations, epistemicism is thought to be the right theory of vagueness, then it is fair to simply deny M2, and say it could be a brute semantic fact that oj satisfies ˜cloud™ and ok does not.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

However, epistemicism is a well developed research program that provides a coherent framework for thinking about vagueness.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

And since we have to appeal to the most contentious feature of epistemicism, that there are these brute semantic facts that are beyond our epistemic access, some may doubt its plausibility.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

Similarly, in the case of vague propositions, one might adopt epistemicism: the position that vague words like ˜bald™ in fact have precise extensions, but that we can never know what these precise extensions are (see Williamson 1994, Horwich 1998b).

The Deflationary Theory of Truth Stoljar, Daniel 2007

Most philosophers believe that epistemicism is tantamount to the acceptance of a linguistic miracle.

Vagueness Sorensen, Roy 2006

This defence of deflationism can be bolstered by noting that, like inflationists, deflationists can try to deal with the liar paradox by modifying classical logic (Field 2003), by adopting epistemicism (Restall

The Deflationary Theory of Truth Stoljar, Daniel 2007