externalists

Many internalists are convinced that externalists are simply re-defining epistemic terms in such a way that they lose the kind of meaning that the philosopher wants them to have in order to ask the kind of penetrating philosophical questions that are the peculiar product of a kind of philosophical curiosity.

to day 2009

More charitably and correctly, internalists such as Williams can be read as fully appreciating the distinction but questioning whether, if justifying reasons had as little to do with what explains and motivates action as externalists suppose, we could retain any real purchase on what our talk of such reasons is even about.

Reasons for Action: Justification vs. Explanation Lenman, James 2009

According to virtually all externalists, one can arrive at a justified belief in

to day 2009

Certainly, paradigm externalists would reject the second clause of the principle of inferential justification.

to day 2009

In response to this charge, externalists (Burge 1988, Heil 1988) have tried to show that the contents of self-attributions will appropriately track the contents of the lower-order states they concern, even if the subject remains ignorant of the salient environmental factors.

Self-Knowledge Gertler, Brie 2008

Some externalists (e.g. Sawyer (1998)) seem willing to bite the bullet and say that, since externalism is true (and we know it) and we have priviledged access to our thoughts, we also have a kind of a priori access to our external environment.

Externalism About Mental Content Lau, Joe 2008

For externalists are typically committed to counting expressions as “synonymous” if they happen to be linked in the right way to the same external phenomena, even if a thinker doesn't realize that they are!

The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Rey, Georges 2008

Finally, some externalists (Sawyer 1998) defend the idea that introspective self-knowledge can yield limited information about the environment.

Self-Knowledge Gertler, Brie 2008

Other externalists (Davies 2003) have argued that one may be warranted in believing that one has a particular thought, and warranted in believing that having that thought requires the presence of certain environmental factors, while lacking warrant for the belief that those factors are present.

Self-Knowledge Gertler, Brie 2008

In reply, externalists (e.g. Wilson (1995)) note that relational properties do enter into causal explanations in many other non-mental domains.

Externalism About Mental Content Lau, Joe 2008