from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- adj. Of, pertaining to or supporting a belief in the primary importance of inference to any account of meaning
- n. A supporter of inferentialism
For a normative inferentialist like Brandom, for instance, this is the question of the relation between normative inferential role and truth conditional content, and he tries to show that the latter can be analysed in terms of the former.
But that implies the inadequacy of "inferentialist accounts" only if all such accounts be taken as intending a complete account of what actually goes on in DD.
I think that inferentialist accounts, of whatever kind, and for all their good, fall short on all four points.
Recanati calls this view anti-inferentialist in that “communication is as direct as perception” (Recanati 2002: 109): the processing of the speaker's intentions is direct, automatic, and unreflective.
When Hegel declares the syllogism to be “the truth” of the judgment, he might be thought, as has been suggested by Robert Brandom, to be advocating a view somewhat akin to contemporary “inferentialist” approaches to semantics.