from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- adj. Capable of being known, understood or comprehended.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English
- adj. That may be known; capable of being discovered, understood, or ascertained.
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
- That may be known; capable of being apprehended, understood, or ascertained.
from WordNet 3.0 Copyright 2006 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.
- adj. capable of being known
This is one area I give postmodern Christians credit for - they embrace uncertainty, they question commonly held assumptions and structures, things are not as "knowable" - as definitive - as they are for the traditional evangelical.
We should therefore feel compelled to grant Joyce's premise that there is such a complete non-moral genealogy only if we have already given up on the idea of knowable moral truths.
Of course this principle must itself be knowable, that is, we get the following logical principle:
And, in either case, the sharp distinction between the real and the phenomenal vanishes; and what remains, is not a reality outside of consciousness, or different from ideas, but a reality related to consciousness, or, in other words, a knowable reality.
I don't think that's knowable, which is why there may not be much that can be done to fix things until we see the actual debacle unfold.
If in this way we are to understand any thing of God's nature, we must by consequence understand so much of our own nature: that is, that it is a reasonable nature, that it is an intelligent nature, that it is a nature capable of improving itself in point of knowledge, by ratiocination and discourse; and even of knowledge concerning the highest and greatest, and first knowable, that is God and the very nature of God.
Only, 'knowable' matters just to those who need rigid definitions.
But any further inquiry along those lines would have disclosed that the ISI was an original patron of the Taliban, a fact "knowable" by anyone yet inconvenient for the ISI's senior partner in Langley, Virginia, to admit.
For example, to define mind and to separate it from the rest of the knowable which is called matter, the general mode of reasoning is as follows: all the knowable which is apparent to our senses is essentially reduced to motion; "mind," that something which lives, feels, and judges, is reduced to "thought."
This seem to me like an almost "knowable" outcome.