nonphenomenal

It might be supposed that the pictorial/discursive distinction is best made in terms of the phenomenal/nonphenomenal distinction, but it is not obvious that this is the case.

Mental Representation Pitt, David 2008

If they [ 'the nonphenomenal material and formal properties' of language] are empirical qualities, pragmatic properties, they will never be able to elevate themselves to the thought of difference.

Notes on 'Seeing Is Reading' 2005

Still, the functionalist elements cannot be ignored if we are to distinguish the phenomenal from the nonphenomenal.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

But then it seems that the crucial work, the naturalizing of the distinctively phenomenal, is being done by the functionalism; as Kriegel puts it, "a theory that accounts for [the phenomenal/nonphenomenal distinction] ... by adverting to the functional role properties of ther mental states in question is a functionalist theory" (p. 62, italics original).

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

Then, in effect, their position is a functionalist account of the difference between phenomenal and nonphenomenal representation.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

By making phenomenal properties basic, this position circumvents the daunting problem of construing phenomenal properties out of (as yet unknown) nonphenomenal properties.

Neutral Monism Stubenberg, Leopold 2005

The X-Phi speakers were Steve Stich (with a nice overview of his work on disagreement over the intuitions that analytic philosophers often appeal to, in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and ethics), Josh Knobe (who outlined experimental work on people's intuitions about consciousness, suggesting that they're willing to ascribe nonphenomenal states much more freely than phenomenal states),

fragments of consciousness 2008

The X-Phi speakers were Steve Stich (with a nice overview of his work on disagreement over the intuitions that analytic philosophers often appeal to, in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and ethics), Josh Knobe (who outlined experimental work on people's intuitions about consciousness, suggesting that they're willing to ascribe nonphenomenal states much more freely than phenomenal states),

fragments of consciousness 2008