nonreductionism

And it is indeed the case that this version of nonreductionism could be true: there is simply no way to show that I am not, after all, an essentially immaterial substance unattached to any particular psychological properties.

Personal Identity and Ethics Shoemaker, David 2008

Both the Biological Criterion and nonreductionism have difficulty meeting some of the key conditions for an ethically motivated theory of personal identity, namely, that it afford us epistemic access to the identity in question, and that it provide genuine explanatory grounds for our practical concerns.

Personal Identity and Ethics Shoemaker, David 2008

The denial of reductionism is called “nonreductionism,” according to which the facts about persons and personal identity consist in some further fact, beyond the facts about physical and psychological continuity, typically a fact about Cartesian egos or souls.

Personal Identity and Ethics Shoemaker, David 2008

And although there is logical space available for a nonreductionism according to which identity isn't what matters for survival and our practical concerns, the universal view is instead the opposite.

Personal Identity and Ethics Shoemaker, David 2008

But whether or not all functionalists view their accounts in these terms, it nonetheless appears that the nonreductionism of functionalism is of a vertical but not horizontal nature, so to speak.

Anomalous Monism Yalowitz, Steven 2005