perdurantist

Another idea is to mimic the “perdurantist” approach to temporal persistence and say that a possible object persists through many possible worlds by having different parts (world stages) at different possible worlds and being the modal-dimensional

Possible Objects Yagisawa, Takashi 2009

(STR) which has had most impact on the debate about temporal parts: three quite different arguments have been proposed, each of which purports to show that STR lends support to the perdurantist claim that things have temporal parts.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

One option is to mimic the perdurantist temporary-coincidence account, but without the temporal parts.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Let's look at the perdurantist and endurantist stories in turn.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Other non-standard views take the basic perdurantist idea that persistence is much like spatial extension, then they develop the idea in different ways.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

There are a number of reasons why perdurantists typically adopt universalism First, the claim that there is a large number of nested four-dimensional objects is central to the most common perdurantist account of vagueness in persistence (see section 5).

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

From a typical perdurantist perspective, apparent indeterminacy in persistence arises from our fumbling failures to deal with the multitude of precise four-dimensional objects around us.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Central to the perdurantist account of temporary coincidence is the claim that, while it is bizarre to think that two distinct objects could entirely coincide, there is nothing bizarre about two objects partially coinciding by sharing a part, and nothing bizarre about an object partially coinciding with one of its own parts.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004