psychosemantics

Akins 'critique casts doubt on whether details of sensory transduction will scale up to provide an adequate unified psychosemantics.

The Philosophy of Neuroscience Bickle, John 2006

A psychosemantics seeks to explain what it is for a representational state to be about something: to provide an account of how states and events can have specific representational content.

The Philosophy of Neuroscience Bickle, John 2006

He adverts to the psychosemantics sometimes appealed to by certain representationalists (Dretske and Tye in particular), arguing that neither indicator/covariation semantics nor teleosemantics will predict that Cynthia is representing redness.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

Wager goes on to express doubt that any externalist (wide) psychosemantics will be able to predict Cynthia's representing redness.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

A psychosemantics such as Dretske's (1986) that makes essential reference to function might therefore distinguish representata here. (iv) To the extent that each creature's two eyes differ functionally from each other, the creature has two different and nonequivalent visual systems.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

Of course, some psychosemantics would be needed to explain what it is in virtue of which a brain item represents greenness in particular.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

But this seems to have matters the wrong way around: If this psychosemantics or that one cannot predict that Cynthia is representing redness, that is an objection to the psychosemantics, not to the claim that Cynthia is representing redness, which claim is more credible than is any particular psychosemantics.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

But if he is right about that, the representationalist should reject externalist psychosemantics.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

But every known plausible psychosemantics makes intentional contents wide.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006

What determines a psychological state's intentional content is given by a psychosemantics, in Fodor's (1987) sense.

Representational Theories of Consciousness Lycan, William 2006