rationalizable

Bernheim and Pearce argue that when only the structure of the game and the agents 'Bayesian rationality are common knowledge, the game should be considered “solved” if every agent plays a rationalizable strategy.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

When agents have common knowledge of the game and their Bayesian rationality only, one can predict that they will follow a rationalizable strategy profile.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

Figure 3.1 if Joanna and Lizzi have common knowledge of all of the payoffs at every strategy combination, and they have common knowledge that both are Bayesian rational, then any of the four pure strategy profiles is rationalizable.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

In general, the set of a game's rationalizable strategy combinations contains the set of the game's pure strategy Nash equilibria, and this example shows that the containment can be proper.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

Roughly speaking, a rationalizable strategy is any strategy an agent may choose without violating common knowledge of Bayesian rationality.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

The rationalizable strategy profiles are the four profiles that remain after deleting all of the strategy combinations in which either Lizzi or Joanna play s2.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

In these circumstances, any strategy that is a best reply to any vector of mixed strategies available in NE is said to be rationalizable.

Game Theory Ross, Don 2006

Pure coordination games are characterized by non-unique vectors of rationalizable strategies.

Game Theory Ross, Don 2006

(s2, s1), are rationalizable, since it is rational for Lizzi and Joanna to conform with either equilibrium given appropriate distributions.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

(s1j1, snjn) ˆˆ S is rationalizable if and only if the agents have a Bayes concordant system μ of beliefs and, for each agent k ˆˆ N,

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007