self-positing

Yet the self to which the philosophizing turns is not understood as an empty or merely formal capacity for self-positing.

Georg Friedrich Philipp von Hardenberg [Novalis] Gjesdal, Kristin 2009

They hypostatized his notion of spontaneous self-positing, baking it into a largely aesthetic vocabulary of the creative power of imagination.

Georg Friedrich Philipp von Hardenberg [Novalis] Gjesdal, Kristin 2009

With Fichte, philosophy was grounded in one ultimate and unifying principle: that of the I's positing of itself as absolute and free (that is, in the jargon of the period, of the I positing itself as absolutely self-positing).

Georg Friedrich Philipp von Hardenberg [Novalis] Gjesdal, Kristin 2009

For example, in their analysis of the polity Schlegel and Novalis are first and foremost concerned not with figures of self-positing (self-creation and self-destruction), but with the potentially more fundamental notion of self-affection.

Patriot Acts: The Political Language of Henrich von Kleist 2006

The movement of such a patriotic agency is not the self-positing or self-negating of an absolute subject, but the self-affecting discourse of a language that no individual hero can call his own.

Patriot Acts: The Political Language of Henrich von Kleist 2006

Yet is the thought of being not then simply a reversal of the metaphysics of subjectivity, insofar as it would simply turn the subject's self-positing around into the self-positing of being?

Archive 2007-01-01 enowning 2007

The very idea of subjectivity, which is that of man's self-positing and positing the outside as object, rests on the idea of something facing.

Archive 2007-01-01 enowning 2007

Since this activity of “self-positing” is taken to be the fundamental feature of I-hood in general, the first principle asserts that “the I posits itself as self-positing.”

Johann Gottlieb Fichte Breazeale, Dan 2006

Like all of Fichte's systematic treatises of the Jena period, The System of Ethics begins with a detailed analysis of what is involved in the self-positing of the I.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte Breazeale, Dan 2006

Instead, the I is simply what it posits itself to be, and thus its “being” is, so to speak, a consequence of its self-positing, or rather, is co-terminus with the same.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte Breazeale, Dan 2006