ampliative

Thus, the kind of ampliative inference I posit as the norm, i.e., inference to the best explanation, must and does exhibit, in the concrete, the features Brandon discusses.

Archive 2007-01-01 Mike L 2007

Thus, the kind of ampliative inference I posit as the norm, i.e., inference to the best explanation, must and does exhibit, in the concrete, the features Brandon discusses.

Siris on development of doctrine Mike L 2007

By contrast, "ampliative" inference is not strictly deductive.

Ampliative development of doctrine Mike L 2006

What I suggest is done by "ampliative" DD is interpretation by inference: the conclusions of warranted ampliative inferences in DD just are what the normative sources, which supply the premises for deductive arguments, mean.

Archive 2006-12-01 Mike L 2006

I've urged that some DD is "ampliative," meaning that its legitimate results amplify our understanding of the depositum fidei without being formally deducible from the normative sources and other, equally unexceptionable premises.

Archive 2006-12-01 Mike L 2006

What I suggest is done by "ampliative" DD is interpretation by inference: the conclusions of warranted ampliative inferences in DD just are what the normative sources, which supply the premises for deductive arguments, mean.

Ampliative development of doctrine II: a reply to Scott Carson Mike L 2006

I've urged that some DD is "ampliative," meaning that its legitimate results amplify our understanding of the depositum fidei without being formally deducible from the normative sources and other, equally unexceptionable premises.

Ampliative development of doctrine III, continued Mike L 2006

By contrast, "ampliative" inference is not strictly deductive.

Archive 2006-12-01 Mike L 2006

For example, Laudan suggests that we might reasonably hold the resources of deductive logic to be insufficient to single out just one acceptable response to disconfirming evidence, but not that deductive logic plus the sorts of ampliative principles of good reasoning typically deployed in scientific contexts are insufficient to do so.

Underdetermination of Scientific Theory Stanford, Kyle 2009

But his straightforward appeal to further epistemic resources like ampliative principles of belief revision that are supposed to help narrow the merely logical possibilities down to those which are reasonable or rationally defensible is itself problematic, at least in the case of Quine.

Underdetermination of Scientific Theory Stanford, Kyle 2009