from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition
- n. Excessive concern with outer circumstances or appearances.
from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- n. Excessive regard to outward acts or appearances, especially in religion. The denial of internalism.
- n. The act of judging by outward appearance or acts.
- n. The belief that only things that can be observed by senses are real.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English
- n. The quality of being manifest to the senses; external acts or appearances; regard for externals.
- n. That philosophy or doctrine which recognizes or deals only with externals, or objects of sense perception; positivism; phenomenalism.
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
- n. Same as phenomenalism.
- n. Attention or devotion to externals; especially, undue regard to externals, as of religion.
But if externalism can be defined broadly enough to encompass Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Kripke, and Burge, still the comparison is strained when we take account of the different sources of ˜externalism™ in the phenomenologists.
This does not yet rule out externalism, which is compatible with this result if any of a number of different claims are true.
He denounced in unmeasured terms the externalism of Pharisaic observance of the Law, and insisted on its spirit being observed as well as the letter.
But this kind of externalism is not too interesting.
The comments are quite good as well, since the other interpretation is a kind of externalism due to ones knowledge depending upon context.
I found Williamson's kind of externalism wherein knowledge is a basic mental state and not justified belief quite persuasive with a feeling that it probably is closer to the truth than anything else I've read.
You need to have a look at externalism and reliabilism in epistemology.
If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull.
Can one extend active externalism to perceptual consciousness?
According to what Clark and Chalmers 1998 call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes.