from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- n. An adherent of any of the various kinds of nominalism.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English
- n. One of a sect of philosophers in the Middle Ages, who adopted the opinion of Roscelin, that general conceptions, or universals, exist in name only.
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
- n. A believer in nominalism.
from WordNet 3.0 Copyright 2006 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.
- n. a philosopher who has adopted the doctrine of nominalism
Sorry, no etymologies found.
Thus, if the paraphrase nominalist view is going to be a genuine alternative to fictionalism, it has to involve the thesis that the paraphrases that nominalists are offering capture the real meanings of ordinary mathematical sentences.
(For a good in-depth discussion and critique of the various paraphrase nominalist views, see Burgess and Rosen (1997).)
In sum, then, the idea here is that fictionalists about pure mathematics can endorse a paraphrase nominalist view of mixed mathematical sentences.
More specifically, a paraphrase nominalist would just be a fictionalist who thinks that we ought to alter our mathematical language, or what we mean by our mathematical utterances; or perhaps the claim would simply be that we could alter our mathematical language if we wanted to and that this fact provides fictionalists with a way of responding to certain objections.
When he went to New Guinea, Dr. Mayr once explained in an interview with Omni magazine, there was a popular school of thinking known as the nominalist school of philosophy that held that species did not, in reality, exist.
Historians also labeled Gregory a "nominalist," a term so broad and vague when applied to fourteenth-century thinkers that, when it was used without qualification, it tended to mislead and to obscure the differences among them, as for example between Ockham and Gregory.
If you believe that there are only individual instances and illustrations of various classified emotions and desires and acts, and that abstractions are only the inevitable categories of thought, you would in the Middle Ages have been called a "nominalist".
Even the nominalist must presuppose some form called "frog" to which this frog and that frog are more or less faithful.
This puts him squarely in the nominalist camp, which is too bad because nominalism is incoherent.
I rather think that we have simply descended with Alice into the nominalist Wonderland where a word “means just what [we] choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”