from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- adj. Current, actual, occurring.
- n. An event, something that occurs.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English
- adj. Occurring or happening; hence, incidental; accidental.
- n. One who meets; hence, an adversary.
- n. Anything that happens; an occurrence.
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
- That comes in the way; occurring; incidental.
- n. One who comes to meet or comes against another; especially, an antagonist; an adversary.
- n. Incident; anything that happens; happening; event; occurrence.
from WordNet 3.0 Copyright 2006 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.
- n. an event that happens
- adj. presently occurring (either causally or incidentally)
Most theorists believe that there are mental states ” such as occurrent thoughts or judgments ” that are access-conscious (in whatever is the correct functionally-definable sense), but that are not phenomenally conscious.
But sense (4), that of "what it is like" to entertain a given quale, can be generalized: It is not only qualia that have the higher-order what-it's-like property; arguably propositional attitudes and other states that do not involve qualia in sense (3), such as occurrent thoughts, have it too (Siewert
Apples are naturally occurrent and edible while sparkplugs are inedible artifacts.
Consequently, while his epistemological views regarding sensory episodes parallel his treatment of the epistemology of occurrent thoughts, Sellars 'account of the ontology of sensations diverges dramatically from his functionalist account of thoughts.
Although the primary use of semantical terms remains the semantical characterization of overt verbal episodes, this Jonesean theory thus carries over the applicability of those semantical categories to its postulated inner episodes. i.e., to (occurrent) thoughts.
The concept of an occurrent thought is that of a causally-mediating logico-semantic role player, whose determinate empirical/ontological character, and thereby logical space for some form of “identity theory” is so far left open.
Thus the incorrigibility mentioned before reduces to one's incorrigibility about one's occurrent experiences.
Where c and e are actual occurrent events, this truth condition can be simplified somewhat.
While perpetrators differ in their strongest occurrent motivations, it is important to ask why so many men who wish to harm or violate women do so in a sexual manner.
It seems clear that the occurrent version of the charge is only damaging to egalitarianism if the basic distinction between envy and resentment is accepted.