paraconsistent

Or perhaps more flexible ontology languages built over paraconsistent logics?

Data sharing and boundary objects | Serendipity 2009

Or perhaps more flexible ontology languages built over paraconsistent logics?

2009 April | Serendipity 2009

Or perhaps more flexible ontology languages built over paraconsistent logics?

2009 April 24 | Serendipity 2009

With a paraconsistent logic, one may accept this without triviality.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

The thought is that the correct logic of knowability is paraconsistent.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

More recent developments of the paraconsistent approach appear in Beall (2009) and Priest (2009).

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

In a paraconsistent logic contradictions do not trivialize a theory, because they do not

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

That is, in a paraconsistent logic the inference from p ˆ§ ¬p to an arbitrary conclusion r is not valid.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

Depending on the paraconsistent logic, the paraconsistist may object to use of reductio, or may object to other inferences.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

And so it is suggested that one go paraconsistent and embrace Kp ˆ§ ¬Kp as a true consequence of the knowability principle.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009