from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition
- transitive v. Logic To negate, deny, or contradict.
from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- v. To negate, deny or contradict.
- v. To take or carry away; to remove.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English
- transitive v. To take or carry away; to remove.
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
- To take or carry away; remove.
- In logic, to deny: opposed to posit.
- In Hegelian logic, to cancel by a subsequent movement.
That's classic High Academic dialect, but I was able to hack my way through most of it; the verb "sublate," however, defeated me.
I remember coming across "sublate" in some English-language discussion of Hegel.
I would have no idea what "sublate" meant, even knowing Latin.
They sublate not themselves mutually, not the one the other externally; but each sublates itself in itself, and is in its own self the contrary of itself.
The point is not to just to sidestep the nativist critique but to sublate it, in the manner in which Engels understood sublating Hegel in his critique of Ludwig Feuerbach; to take into consideration that which is relevant, effective and forceful in the critique but at the same time to break away from its preoccupation with origins and authenticity.
W idly compared those divisions to the one that people had long used to make sense of Percy Shelley, the opposition between idealism and skepticism that received its own categorical shake-up with the 1980s stress on Percy's language, which did not so much sublate idealism and skepticism as reorient the discussion around a deconstructive figuring of tropes preceding either of those terms.
But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places also?
The assertion that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects -- such as jars and waterpots -- are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its real existence at another time and place.
For in his case the non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which does not admit of being sublated by knowledge, is not removed, although that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near.
Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception.