Kp

Notice that our presentation of Fitch's reasoning makes no explicit mention of the assumption that Kp ˆ§ ¬Kp is impossible.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

Additionally, if p is true and Kp is false, then Williamson's conjunction is true.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

For Fitch's reasoning allegedly turns on the assumption that, for all p, it is impossible that Kp

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

Accordingly, on this account, the quantified expression that Kp abbreviates is non-rigid.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

SKP is applied at lines 3 and 6 to p and Kp, respectively.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

And so it is suggested that one go paraconsistent and embrace Kp ˆ§ ¬Kp as a true consequence of the knowability principle.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

Alternatively, Kvanvig suggests, we may characterize Kp rigidly to say, ˜there is an actual being x and actual time t such that it is known by x at t that p.™

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

Kp I always find your posts so well thought out and organised.

One Year Gone, part II: The Navel-Gazing Year kittenpie 2007

Beall contends that (1) Fitch's proof turns on the assumption that, for all statements p, the contradiction Kp ˆ§

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009

Beall suggests that the knower gives us some independent evidence for thinking Kp ˆ§ ¬Kp, for some p, that the full description of human knowledge has the interesting feature of being inconsistent.

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability Brogaard, Berit 2009