from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition
- n. The state of having or being formed by an intention.
- n. Philosophy The property of being about or directed toward a subject, as inherent in conscious states, beliefs, or creations of the mind, such as sentences or books.
from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- n. The defining characteristic of the mental state of a person when deliberating about an intention.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English
- n. The quality or state of being intentional; purpose; design.
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
- n. The character or fact of being intentional; designedness.
from WordNet 3.0 Copyright 2006 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.
- n. expressive of intentions
Sorry, no etymologies found.
The "aboutness" and "goal-directedness" of eukaryotic cells and how it relates to nano-intentionality is defined as follows (p14):
Daniel Smith: You seem to be missing the full implications of the statement "intentionality is not in the objects or their actions".
You seem to be missing the full implications of the statement "intentionality is not in the objects or their actions".
Second, if intentionality is not in the object you are observing, it does not follow that the source could not be some other material object.
You yourself just told us that intentionality is not in the objects or their actions, but you seem to be missing the fact that that means we can only observe intentionality by observing the designer.
Don P: You yourself just told us that intentionality is not in the objects or their actions, but you seem to be missing the fact that that means we can only observe intentionality by observing the designer.
From my perspective, intentionality is a useful concept, in fact an indispensably useful concept, so from a pragmatic standpoint it is as real as anything else.
If not, then intentionality is ontologically irreducible and hence not naturalistically explained.
The eliminativist believes that intentionality is ontologically reducible to the non-intentional without remainder.
This argument will appeal to those who think that intentionality is a characteristic of propositions, that there are a lot of propositions, and that intentionality or aboutness is dependent upon mind in such a way that there couldn't be something p about something where p had never been thought of.