from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition
- adj. Of or relating to Aristotle or to his philosophy.
- n. A follower of Aristotle or his teachings.
- n. A person whose thinking and methods tend to be empirical, scientific, or commonsensical.
from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License
- n. A disciple of Aristotle (for ancient Greek disciples, see peripatetic; for medieval Christian ones, see scholastic)
- adj. Of or pertaining to Aristotle, his philosophy, logic, or followers.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English
- adj. Of or pertaining to Aristotle, the famous Greek philosopher (384-322 b. c.).
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
- Pertaining to Aristotle (born at Stagira in Macedonia, 384 b. c., died 322 b. c.), the father of logic and the most influential of all philosophers, or to his works, school, or philosophy. See peripatetic.
- Formal logic, based on the four propositional forms: All S is P; No S is P; Some S is P; Some S is not P.
- n. A follower of Aristotle. See peripatetic.
from WordNet 3.0 Copyright 2006 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.
- adj. of or relating to Aristotle or his philosophy
- n. a follower of Aristotle or an adherent of Aristotelianism
Consciousness (which is not the same thing as understanding) is likely what we nowadays call an "emergent property" but which in Aristotelian terms did not require a peculiar name.
Philosophical debates over idealization have focused on two general kinds of idealizations: so-called Aristotelian and Galilean idealizations.
The so-called Aristotelian dramatic canons, formulated by
The benumbing influence of antiquity -- or rather of that extended period which may be called the Aristotelian age, the age in which all philosophic thought was utterly benumbed by the Greek literature -- has not yet passed away.
This has been called the Aristotelian Hypothesis, because Aristotle, while he spoke of a Supreme Mind or Reason, maintained not only the eternity of matter, but also the eternity of "substantial forms and qualities."
None of these interpretations quite captures Bonaventure's relation to these three philosophers or his own approach to the relations among reason, faith, and theology, because they implicitly employed a Thomistic model for being an Aristotelian, with the result that Bonaventure's failures derive from his not being the kind of Aristotelian Thomas Aquinas was.
In other words, Leibniz can be interpreted as advocating, at least in this period, a kind of Aristotelian hylomorphism, in which substances are composites of matter and form.
As such, it is about Aristotle's logic, which is not always the same thing as what has been called "Aristotelian" logic.
Porphyry solves this dilemma by insisting that the so-called Aristotelian categories ” substance, quality, quantity etc., dealt with in the Categories ” are
Jefferson was "Aristotelian" in his politics, but not in his morality.