from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Edition.
- adjective Unrelated to moral or ethical considerations.
- adjective Having no moral or ethical standards; lacking a moral sense.
from The Century Dictionary.
- Unconnected with morals; having no relation to ethics or morals; not involving ethical or moral considerations.
from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English.
- adjective Neither moral nor immoral; having no connection with morals; not within the sphere of morals or ethics; not ethical.
from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License.
- adjective Alternative spelling of
Sorry, no etymologies found.
And if that is true for Moore-paradoxical moral sentences, it should also go for Moore-paradoxical nonmoral sentences.
According to Blackburn, it is not just the simple fact that moral properties supervene on nonmoral properties that needs to be explained.
Nor is it just that appropriate moral predication must supervene on nonmoral predication, to put the point in a way that does not beg the question against non-cognitivism.
Full and vivid awareness of relevant nonmoral facts.
Moral realists have argued that moral disagreements very often derive from disagreement about nonmoral issues.
Blackburn thinks that we require such an explanation even if there are metaphysically or nomically necessary connections between moral and nonmoral terms or properties.
On this proposal the norms would be needed to represent the contents of the realist's thought because different realist theories might have the moral properties supervene on different nonmoral properties and a person could be a realist without being committed to the truth of any particular realist theory.
Take a version of expressivism which says that a moral judgment that such and such an action is wrong predicates a nonmoral property of that action and at the same time expresses disapproval of that property.
With this sort of difficulty in mind, Brandt (1954) undertook his own anthropological study of Hopi peoples in the American southwest, and found issues for which there appeared to be serious moral disagreement between typical Hopi and white American attitudes that could not plausibly be attributed to differences in belief about nonmoral facts.
It is rather to explain how honoring the supervenience constraint can be a requirement of linguistic competence, even while there is no analytic entailment from nonmoral claims to moral claims.